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Abstract. This thesis argues that there is a hegemonic and inflexible discourse on Tibetan identity, 
though there are examples of dissent. This identity discourse constructs a narrative on ‘Tibet’ which 
Tibetans claim. In turn, by claiming ‘Tibet’, Tibetans are claiming their own identity. ‘Tibet’ is 
represented by the government in exile. This constitutive relationship between ‘Tibet’ and 
‘Tibetanness’ results in a narrativising of history and an Othering of Shugden practitioners and 
Chinese, in order to define a coherent national identity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 1959 the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to India. It marked the beginning of a period 
of exile for the Tibetan government and many Tibetans. In the years before that, China had 
increasingly taken hold of Tibet, leading up to Tibetan resistance and the eventual flight of 
many. In India Tibetans established a Government-in-Exile, which was seen as a continuation 
of the government from Tibet. This government is not officially recognised by any country. 
The political system increasingly democratised under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, who 
resigned from political office in 2011. Currently, Tibetans are spread over South Asia, mainly 
India, Nepal and Bhutan, as well as in Western regions including North America and Europe. 
After more than 50 years of exile, Tibetans still feel connected to each other. However, to 
what extent is this common identity related to the territory of Tibet? 
   
Literature 
Tibet has been largely ignored by International Relations (IR) literature. Sometimes 
the broader geopolitical situation in the region is discussed (Anand 2007: xiii-xv), but 
Tibetans as a topic by themselves only feature in research performed by Anand. He explains 
the lack of attention by IR mainly by referring to the Western orientation of the discipline. 
The limits of a discipline focused on sovereign nation-states and great power politics, are 
indeed becoming visible when considering the enormous gap in IR literature concerning 
Tibet. Tibet can provide IR with important research topics, including human rights, diaspora 
and national identity (Anand 2007: xvi). 
The concept of ‘diaspora’ can shed light on the Tibetan case. The definition of a 
diaspora is contested, but most definitions at least imply a dispersion of the group of people, 
often coerced, a ‘homeland orientation’ and ‘boundary-maintenance’ (Brubaker 2005: 5-6). 
These criteria are met by the Tibetan case. Tibetans are coercively dispersed over the world, 
even though most Tibetans remained in South Asia. There is a strong homeland orientation 
among Tibetans. Tibetans are active in supporting an independent Tibet, have a collective 
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idea about Tibet, and identify themselves in terms of the homeland. The idea of return is also 
present, though not always in a physical sense. Not all Tibetans would physically go back, but 
at least the idea of return is prevalent in Tibetan discourse (Safran quoted in Brubaker 2005: 
5; Anand 2003: 214). Thirdly, Tibetans are using boundary-maintenance as the members 
often keep a separate identity from that of the hostland. The acceptance of Indian citizenship 
is discouraged and many Tibetans in India are not well integrated. Tibetans in Western 
countries seem to adapt to host countries quite well, but at the same time they keep attached to 
their Tibetan identity. US citizenship is often encouraged as a strategic asset in claiming 
Tibet. This does therefore not necessarily mean that these US citizens feel ‘less Tibetan’ 
(Hess 2009: 2; Jampa 2014). This characterisation as a diaspora can highlight that Tibetans 
are bound together by a certain national identity and group consciousness, that this identity 
has been constructed and that the homeland plays an important role (Anand 2003: 212, 223; 
Hess 2009: 4-8). 
The bonds between Tibetans are largely based on collective ideas, memories and 
identification, rather than physical or practical circumstances. Many of these members are not 
physically living together or dependent upon each other, but are bound by their ideas of being 
connected. This Tibetan diaspora is therefore also an ‘imagined community’. A member of 
this community would not know all others, but ‘in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion’ (Anderson 2006: 6). Tibetans are not living in the same territory, but are still 
connected because they imagine themselves as one community. Because of the novelty and 
socially/discursively constructed character of Tibetan nationalism, the ‘constructionist’ view 
advanced by Anderson fits the case better than alternatives that emphasise the natural and 
historically continuous existence of nationalism. Nationalism is discursively constructed, not 
an ontological and fixed entity (Smith 2010: 49-63, 86-7). However, imagining is a 
continuous process, and therefore ‘imagining community’ might better grasp the way it is 
used here (Anand 2007: 126).  
The ‘imagined community’ of Anderson referred to modern, secular and Western 
nationalism. Dreyfus (2002) criticises this, arguing that Tibetan nationalism relies heavily on 
traditional Tibetan values and has a religious character. He argues that there was already a 
sense of belonging to a single country before the expulsion of the Dalai Lama. Religious and 
traditional values are indeed important in Tibetan nationalism. However, Tibetan political 
nationalism itself is recent. It started developing in the 1950s under the Chinese threat and 
became fully articulated only in exile. Modern circumstances, including communication 
networks, made it possible for the diaspora to stay coherent despite of distance. Before exile, 
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many Tibetans primarily identified with their region, while in exile Tibetans started 
identifying with Tibet as a whole (Anand 2003: 215, 222; Anand 2007: 100; Huber 2001; 
Lopez 1998: 197-8; Shakya 1999; Smith 2010). Tibetan nationalism thus incorporated 
traditional values but is itself inherently modern. It is characterised by religion, but this was 
used in order to emphasise a distinct national identity in a modern sense. Therefore, this 
religious character does not necessarily have to clash with the novel and constructed 
characterisation of Tibetan nationalism. It was constructed, because of the need to claim back 
Tibet (Anand 2002: 221; Kolas 1996: 62). 
The novelty of Tibetan nationalism is analysed in the influential work Prisoners of 
Shangri-La by Lopez. He (1998: 196-200) argues that a common Tibetan identity was only 
needed in exile, and therefore only then created. However, it was afterwards discursively 
constructed as if it was not recent. Buddhism was highlighted as representing this nationalism. 
However, as the depiction of the past was only created in the present, they perceived their 
own past under the influences of their current surroundings of Western orientalist ideas. 
Lopez argues that these orientalist conceptions of Tibet have largely constructed Tibetan 
identity. Hereby he underestimates the role of Tibetans in appropriating and changing this 
discourse, as he reduces Tibetans to ‘prisoners of Shangri-la’.  
Others have placed more emphasis on the role of Tibetans in their identity-
construction. Western ideas are appropriated by Tibetans and Tibetans thus use these ideas 
themselves (Anand 2000; 2002; 2007). The West had a certain idea of Tibet (peaceful, 
religious,…) and Tibetans appropriated this discourse and changed it in their interest. 
However, the idea of ‘Tibet’ is not only a Western creation. Anand frames the Tibetan 
construction of their identity as a reaction to Western ideas. Western ideas do influence 
Tibetan identity, but Tibetans also construct their own identity in relation to others. Instead of 
being prisoners of Orientalist fantasies, Tibetans are constructing their own identity in 
opposition to China. Exile and the claim on Tibet play a defining role, while orientalist ideas 
can be appropriated in order to support these. The construction of Tibetan identity in terms of 
a reaction to the West (as Lopez does), in fact essentialises Tibetan identity as inherently non-
Western. It frames the issue in such a way that the West-non-West binary is accentuated, 
instead of overcome. This can construct Tibetan identity in only non-Western terms, thereby 
perpetuating and possibly even constructing its distinctive character as a non-Western region. 
This thesis shows that the discursively constituted image of ‘Tibet’ creates Tibetan 
identity to a large extent. It is often noted that a maintenance of an exoticised image of Tibet 
can harm the Tibetan culture and struggle for independence (Anand 2002: 220; Anand 2003: 
4 
 
221), though this image can also be used as a ‘soft power resource’ (Magnusson 2002). The 
appropriation of Western discourse is indeed a strategic aspect in Tibetan identity making. 
The discursive construction of Tibet as a territory has the effect of strengthening the need to 
claim Tibet as a territory and therefore use Western ideas to gain support. This ‘territory’ 
provides a reason to appropriate the Western discourse, emphasising cultural distinctiveness 
and historical independence in order to strengthen the claim this territory. This territory thus 
plays a pivotal role. However, it is the discursive construction of this territory (‘Tibet’) rather 
than the actual territory that performs this role. 
This thesis works from an IR perspective, while most existing literature on Tibet is 
more anthropological in nature. This thesis focuses exclusively on the transnational 
community. This community is mainly analysed as a whole, in order to theorise national 
processes. When works on Tibetan identity focus on discourse, this is usually done from a 
postcolonial perspective (e.g. Anand). This thesis uses poststructuralist theorising, offering a 
new perspective. The existing literature on the Tibetan diaspora usually focuses on Tibetans 
living in India, and sporadically the US. Europe is usually not taken into account, which this 
thesis is trying to rectify by adding European sources (mainly interviews). Though many 
works discuss the idealised image of Tibet (e.g. Lopez 1998; Anand 2007), these works 
usually do not question the claim they make on this territory. This thesis argues that this claim 
is not based on a prediscursive geographical entity, but on a discursively constructed ‘Tibet’. 
By ‘claiming Tibet’ Tibetans are at the same time claiming, and thereby constructing, their 
own identity. 
 
Theory and methodology 
This thesis draws upon poststructuralist theorising, thereby using discourse analysis. 
This method focuses on how things are framed by looking at the way things are articulated, 
usually in speech or writing (Hansen 2006). To say that discourse is ‘all that matters’ does not 
mean that there is no world, but that it is impossible to objectively know about that world 
without interpreting it (Campbell 1992: 6). Therefore, it is useful to analyse how certain 
‘truths’ come into being and how ideas and identities are constructed. Because language 
constructs meaning, identities are always in process: they are performatively constituted. 
There are thus no ontological fixed identities. This language and practice constructs 
boundaries, it constructs identities in opposition to Others. Foreign policies are such a 
boundary-producing practice, and thus constructs identity as well as it is based upon identity 
(Campbell 1992: 85; Hansen 2006: 1). 
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The focus on discourse necessitates a reference to the agency-structure debate, as some 
argue that this poststructuralist interpretation leaves not enough space for agency (e.g. Wight 
1999). An explanation of the position on agency that is used here is thus necessary. As Doty 
argued: ‘the very possibility of ‘objective’ structures is lodged within the self-presence of the 
subjects, who are themselves socially/discursively constructed’, complicating the 
subject/object distinction (Doty 1997: 371). Practices construct both agents and structure, and 
the meaning of these practices is signified by discourse. However, this meaning is never 
stable nor determined (Doty 1997: 377-9). Tibetan identity is constructed by discourse, but 
this discourse is not necessarily determined by Orientalism but by practice. Arguing that 
Tibetans are ‘prisoners of Shangri-la’ (Lopez 1998) is denying them any agency, while 
arguing that discourse limits but also creates possibilities, gives Tibetans agency over which 
discourse to use and how to use it. Discourses construct possibilities for framing and 
understanding, but agents have agency in using these possibilities. As discourses are unstable, 
overlapping and often contradictory, there are many different actions possible (Campbell 
1999: 6; Doty 1997: 385). The use of alternative interpretations of Tibetan identity is analysed 
in the section Resistance and dissent below.  
In order to analyse Tibetan discourse, two radically different books (Thurman 2008; 
International Shugden Community 2013) were highlighted. These both represented a clear 
example of the respective discourse they were a part of, and could thus show the workings of 
this discourse. Other popular works that reach many people and thus are a powerful exponent 
of this discourse were added, including the autobiography of the Dalai Lama. Academic 
works based on ethnographic research and historical literature formed an important 
background.
1
 Two in-depth interviews, one with a politically inactive young Tibetan and one 
with an activist Tibetan, combined with a questionnaire and the attendance of a lecture and 
teaching by the Dalai Lama, provided valuable additional insight into Tibetan perception. 
 
Structure 
This thesis will continue where the literature left off. It will research how Tibetan 
identity and the territory of ‘Tibet’ are related, and what processes play a role in the 
constitution of both. It is argued that on the one hand, a cohesive identity is created in order to 
claim this territory. On the other hand, the claiming of this territory, and thereby the idea of 
that territory itself, is constructing their own identity. By claiming Tibet, Tibetans are 
                                                          
1
 Especially useful as a background were: Hess 2009; Shakya 1999; Vahali 2009. 
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claiming themselves as Tibetans. Both these processes need the creation of Others. In order to 
know one’s own identity, it needs to be constructed against an Other. Claiming Tibet provides 
a need to show that Tibetans are different from Others and therefore have a ‘right’ to this 
territory. These relationships are illustrated in figure 1. 
The first section of this thesis will discuss Tibetan identity. It is argued that there is an 
inflexible and hegemonic discourse on Tibetan identity. This is caused by the traditional 
hierarchy and the authority of the Dalai Lama, as well as the claim on ‘Tibet’. Discourses that 
differ are automatically designated as a radical Other, inspired by the Chinese. However, there 
are some examples of moderate dissent that can eventually lead to a more flexible 
understanding of Tibetan identity. 
Secondly, the idea of ‘Tibet’ as a discursively constructed territory is explained. 
Tibetans have an image of Tibet that does not correspond to Tibet in the past, but less so to 
the present situation. It is a discursively constructed idea, rather than a geographical entity. 
This ‘Tibet’ is present in exile, as the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government 
represent, and even are to some extent, ‘Tibet’. The authority of the Dalai Lama, the electoral 
system and even the place of residence all symbolise ‘Tibet’. 
The fourth section discusses the narrativisation of history that supports the claim on 
‘Tibet’. History is told in a way that idealises the past and underestimates divisions between 
Tibetans. By this narrative a particular idea of ‘Tibet’ and Tibetan identity is constructed.  
Finally, the process of Othering is explained. It is argued that religion plays an 
important role, as it leads to the exclusion of some (for example Shugden adherents) in order 
to construct ‘Us’. China as an Other serves as another exclusion that constructs Tibetan 
identity and supports the Tibetan claim on ‘Tibet’. 
 
 
Figure 1: A coherent Tibetan identity is 
constructed in order to claim ‘Tibet’. In the 
process ‘Tibet’ itself is created. By claiming 
this ‘Tibet’, Tibetans are at the same time 
‘claiming’ their own identity as a Tibetan. 
For identity construction and the claim on 
Tibet, Others are needed. Source: author. 
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1. TIBETAN IDENTITY DISCOURSE 
Tibetan identity discourse is limited. The dominant discourse idealises Tibetan 
identity. It argues that Tibetans have innate qualities that the world ‘needs’ and it emphasises 
the positive role of the Dalai Lama. The stability of this discourse is caused by power 
structures. The authority of the Dalai Lama and the traditional hierarchy, as well as the claim 
on Tibet, limit the possibility for alternative conceptions of identity. 
 The most dominant discourse, especially in the West, emphasises Tibetan non-
violence, spirituality and the importance and goodness of the Dalai Lama. Often Tibetans are 
associated with environmentalism and gender equality. These qualities are often portrayed as 
innate to the Tibetan people (Huber 2001: 357-60). A clear example of this discourse is the 
book Why the Dalai Lama Matters: his act of truth as the solution for China, Tibet, and the 
world by Robert Thurman (2008). As the title indicates, it argues that the Dalai Lama has an 
extremely important role to play in a solution for Tibet, as well as for the world. The Dalai 
Lama is an ‘apostle of non-violence’ (2008: 12). Thurman sees him as ‘a living Prince of 
Peace […] offering us hope and help in our stressed-out lives and calling upon us to take up 
our own wild joy of universal responsibility’ (2008: 13). He argues that the Dalai Lama is 
very effective ‘at representing the special qualities and precious value of the Tibetan people’ 
(2008: 64). According to Thurman, we should care about Tibet, because ‘as human beings, 
it’s impossible not to care when you know of the appalling manner in which the Tibetans are 
being treated’ (2008: xv). It is about ‘what it means to be human, truly part of the global 
community’ (2008: xvii). Highly idealistic, this work represents Tibetans as ‘victims’ of an 
aggressor and equates them with certain values of peace and non-violence that the world 
‘needs’. The ‘we’ in this book is thus a universal ‘we’. Tibetan culture is something ‘we’ 
should aspire to, while ‘they’ naturally possess these values. 
This discourse is not only used by Westerners. The Dalai Lama uses it as well and is 
an important force in creating this discourse in the first place. Because of his religious 
authority and good reputation he has the power to largely influence Tibetan discourse. In 2004 
he stated that Tibetans are ‘endowed with inborn qualities of honesty, peace, and a sense of 
moral integrity’ (quoted in Thurman 2008: 182). In his autobiography he states: ‘a future free 
Tibet will seek to help all those in need, protect Nature, and to promote peace. I believe that 
our Tibetan ability to combine spiritual qualities with a realistic and practical attitude will 
enable us to make a special contribution, in however modest a way’ (Dalai Lama 1990: 271). 
The Dalai Lama has argued that Western values such as democracy are compatible with the 
values of Buddhism (Dalai Lama 1999). He thus stresses the innate peaceful values of 
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Tibetans, and portrays a future Tibet as a paradise. He associates these values with the ideals 
of the West, and portrays Buddhism as naturally advertising ‘positive’ values such as freedom 
and equality. This portrayal is largely influenced by his wish to claim back Tibet. He needs to 
create a positive image of Tibetans, as well as a differentiation from Chinese, in order to 
strengthen the claim on Tibet. 
This does not mean that this discourse is always stable. Especially the Dalai Lama 
often changes his discourse depending on the audience. His speeches and writings often have 
a differing emphasis on either human rights or self-determination, and independence or 
autonomy (Anand 2002: 212). However, these differences do not question Tibetan identity. 
Discourses are unstable and overlapping, while only power can create stability (Doty 
1997: 397). This creates opportunities for dissent and different interpretations of Tibetan 
identity. However, power structures are creating stability in the dominant narrative on Tibetan 
identity. An important restraining factor is the religious authority of the Dalai Lama and the 
influence of the traditional Tibetan hierarchy. Hierarchy was an important aspect of life in 
Tibet, and it was not commonly accepted to voice dissent. Many (older) Tibetans do not 
accept that others openly disagree with the Dalai Lama, whom they see as a religious leader 
who knows what is best, instead of a politician that you can reason with. Therefore many 
Tibetans are not criticising the government. This makes the mainstream discourse more 
hegemonic (Vahali 2009: 106; Ardley 2003; Jampa 2014). For example in interviews, there 
was often not much space for critique or alternative opinions (Anonymous interview 2014; 
anonymous questionnaire 2014). However, this mainly applies to the older generation, 
especially those that lived in hierarchical Tibet. Young Tibetans increasingly see the Dalai 
Lama as a politician that you could disagree with, and dissent is thus becoming more common 
(Vahali 2009: 121, 274-6; Hess 2009: 59). Many of these, usually young, Tibetans disagree 
with the Dalai Lama on the Middle Way Approach and non-violence. They want a more 
active stance against China, only accepting independence (Hess 2009: 228-9). 
Power structures such as families and schools play an important role in restricting 
discourse, in order to claim ‘Tibet’. By creating a certain ‘Tibet’ they are defining and 
restricting ‘Tibetanness’. In Tibetan schools in exile young Tibetans learn about Tibet and 
their own Tibetan identity, because they can play an important role in the struggle for Tibet 
(Hess 2009: 57). Tibetan identity is thus created in order to strengthen the claim on ‘Tibet’. 
This unfreedom in articulating Tibetan identity is often encouraged in terms of ‘freedom’. 
Sangay, currently the Tibetan Prime Minister, stated: ‘The election law rules out parties on 
the grounds that, at this point in its freedom struggle, Tibet cannot afford formal partisan 
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divisions’ (Sangay 2003: 126). In this discourse unfreedom now can eventually create 
freedom in ‘Tibet’. 
 
Resistance and dissent 
Though power structures limit dissent, there are examples of alternative interpretations 
of Tibetan identity. Power structures often define these alternatives as a ‘radical Other’ by 
claiming affiliations with ‘the Chinese’. However, there are some examples of more or less 
accepted dissent based on different interpretation of Tibetan identity. 
The most prominent exponent of the radically differing discourse is the book The 
False Dalai Lama: the worst dictator in the modern world. The book questions the legitimacy 
of the Dalai Lama, and claims that he is lying and unjustly banning Shugden worshipping.
2
 
On the current Dalai Lama the book states: ‘from a spiritual point of view there is no one who 
is more evil than this false Dalai Lama’ and calls the Dalai Lama an ‘enemy’ (International 
Shugden Community 2013: 3). The adherents of this discourse also staged several recent 
demonstrations against the Dalai Lama. The representativeness of this discourse is 
questionable, as it is unclear how many people in fact support it. For example, the book has 
been written by the International Shugden community, but the exact authors are not clarified. 
Moderately deviating texts are sometimes equated with this radical discourse, because 
they are not fully supporting the mainstream discourse. Some form of dissent is then 
interpreted as Chinese anti-Tibetan propaganda by members of the mainstream discourse. An 
example is an occasion the Dalai Lama describes in his autobiography. Edward Heath, a 
former UK Prime Minister who had visited Tibet, commented that he feels support for the 
Dalai Lama is diminishing in Tibet, which the Dalai Lama did not agree with. The Dalai 
Lama comments on this in his book: ‘I am highly impressed at the effectiveness of Chinese 
disinformation and deception even on such an experienced person as he is’ (Dalai Lama 1990: 
203). When someone expresses an alternative view from the official Tibetan viewpoint, this is 
often interpreted as caused by Chinese influence. 
Debate and dissent are more easily expressed in unofficial discourse, over which 
power structures have less influence. In some of these cases, Tibetans can remain anonymous. 
TibetBoard, an internet forum, forms such an example. As Brinkerhoff showed (2012), on this 
forum Tibetans more actively voice dissent over policies. Some users publicly disagreed with 
the Dalai Lama, and issues such as non-violence and assimilation are openly discussed. One 
                                                          
2
 For an analysis of the banning of Shugden see page 16. 
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telling post was called ‘dissent and oppositions can not be tolerated!!!’, on which others 
reacted that he was a ‘fascist’ (Brinkerhoff 2012: 91). This post, as well as other heated 
discussions, shows that intolerance of dissent is indeed present, but that there are also 
important forms of dissent. However, this dissent is not always expressed via official 
channels. 
Besides informal communication, official organisations can play an important role. 
Political parties are still absent, but other organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress 
(TYC) articulate differing opinions. The TYC plays an important role almost similar to an 
opposition party. The TYC is pro-independence and more accepting of violence than the older 
political elite. Moreover, it critiques the representational system in which an equal fixed 
number of seats are given to the separate regions and sects of Tibet (Boyd 2004: 95). Though 
the Dalai Lama recognised the organization early on, some members of the established 
political elite (and the older generation) do not appreciate this organization critiquing the 
Government-in-Exile. Some of them tried to promote certain loyal members into TYC 
positions in an attempt to diminish the power of the organisation (Boyd 2004: 31-2; 90). 
However, the TYC still plays an important role in constructing and voicing an alternative 
discourse. 
 
2. CONSTRUCTING ‘TIBET’ 
The current claim on Tibet does not rest on a prediscursive territory, but on the image 
of that territory. In National Deconstruction, Campbell focused not on a fixed, a priori state of 
Bosnia, but on the practices and the construction of ‘metaBosnia’ (1998: ix-x). The concept of 
‘Tibet’ should be understood in these terms. ‘Tibet’ refers not to an a priori geographical 
entity but to the construction of Tibet in discourse. This ‘Tibet’ is always in process, as 
discourse is constantly creating it (Campbell 1992: 10). By claiming this ‘Tibet’, Tibetans are 
claiming their own identity and history. The claim on this constructed territory is thus an 
identity-making act. 
Remembering Tibet plays a crucial role in keeping the diaspora united and as an ideal 
that Tibetans strive for (Ardley 2003: 351; Kolas 1996: 57). The ‘Tibet’ that is remembered 
and constructed is a peaceful country that chose to remain isolated (Dalai Lama 1990: 109) 
where people were living a simple but happy life. Lopez (1998: 10) states that this language 
‘creates Tibet, a Tibet that Tibetans in exile have come to appropriate and deploy in an effort 
to gain both standing in exile and independence for their country’. This ‘Tibet’ does not 
correspond to the situation in the geographical area of Tibet itself. There is limited contact 
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between Tibetans and the diaspora, and many Tibetans have never been to Tibet. China has 
modernised Tibet and many Han Chinese have moved there. Tibetans in Tibet have changed 
by the circumstances of living in China. The situation in Tibet is thus not the same as the 
memory Tibetans in exile have. ‘Tibet’ is an idealised idea of a past Tibet, which Tibetans are 
constantly constructing in discourse. 
‘Foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the 
formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced’ (Hansen 2006: 1). 
Claiming ‘Tibet’ is constituted by a construction of Tibetan identity, but also constructs it. By 
claiming ‘Tibet’, Tibetans are claiming their own identity, because ‘Tibet’ symbolises this 
identity. ‘Tibet’ is what binds Tibetans, and by claiming this, they are framing themselves as 
belonging to this ‘Tibet’. This act of claiming is thus not always related to an actual intention 
to go to the geographical area, but to turn to ‘Tibet’ as a symbol, an identity. Many, especially 
younger, Tibetans probably never want to return to Tibet. They have grown up in Indian or 
Western societies and their struggle for a free Tibet is not aimed at gaining personal access to 
the territory. Their image of ‘Tibet’ corresponds to what they have been taught by relatives 
and in school, which is based on remembering and imagining (Hess 2009: 56). The Tibet that 
these Tibetans are striving for is thus rather an idea than an actual territory. 
 
3. ‘TIBET’ OUTSIDE TIBET 
For many people Tibet is where the Dalai Lama is (Lopez 1998: 184). The Dalai Lama 
and the political system are symbols of what Tibet represents, now that Tibet itself has 
become inaccessible. The constructed ‘Tibet’ outside Tibet might be even more Tibetan than 
Tibet itself. The electoral system shows this link to ‘Tibet’, as the quota system represents the 
claim to ‘Tibet’ as a whole. The place the government in located, Dharamsala, as well as to 
some extent other settlements, also represent ‘Tibet’. Tibet might have become difficult to 
access, ‘Tibet’ has not. 
The Dalai Lama functions as a symbol of Tibet and Tibetan identity, and as a unifying 
force (Hess 2009: 53-4; Anand 2000: 282-3). He represents the Tibetan struggle and their 
policy of non-violence. In this sense, he is the representation of ‘Tibet’ as such. He unifies 
Tibetans, as he functions as a symbol that practically all Tibetans identify themselves with. 
The Dalai Lama travels to many parts of the world, including countries in Europe or North 
America where Tibetans have settled. For people living there, these visits form an important 
way to express their Tibetan identity (Roemer 2008: 98). 
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The increasingly democratic Tibetan government-in-exile can, and already does to a 
certain extent, take over this role of representing the home country. There is no Tibet to easily 
go back to, but there is a political system which represents ‘Tibet’ and to some extent even is 
‘Tibet’ as such. The Government has some distributive functions, especially in India (for 
example in Tibetan education). However, especially for Tibetans living further away, the 
distributive functions of the government are extremely limited compared to ‘normal’ 
governments. Tibetans do not ‘need’ their government the way citizens of another country do, 
as they are already residents (and sometimes citizens) of another country. The Tibetan 
government-in-exile is not recognised by any country, and is therefore also limited in practice 
to perform certain functions. The main connection Tibetans have to their government is based 
on identity. The government represents Tibet, and therefore many Tibetans feel connected to 
it. The primary goals of this government are to keep the claim on the territory of Tibet high on 
the international agenda and to keep the community coherent and Tibetan culture alive. It thus 
has to safeguard ‘Tibet’. 
Tibetan discourse frames ‘Tibet’ as a single entity and claims the entire region of 
Tibet. The electoral system represents this claim. It is based on a quota system. All three 
regions (U-tsang, Amdo and Kham) and the religious sects (Bon and four Buddhist sects) 
have a fixed amount of seats in the legislature (Brox 2012: 459).
3
 However, the outer regions, 
Amdo and Kham, fall almost entirely outside the Tibet Autonomous Region designed by 
China. By explicitly dividing the seats according to these three regions, the system claims to 
represent all regions, and thus makes a political statement (Ardley 2003: 352; Thargyal 1993: 
43-4). However, this system risks deepening regional differences (Sangay 2003: 123) and it 
can impede the most capable candidates to be in office. Tsering Jampa said: “The most 
important I think is that people can really choose, free will, but then on the basis of capacity, 
ability of somebody, and knowledge, not based on regional [affiliations]. … When you elect 
on regional basis, within that region people vote for somebody, but maybe within that region 
there are not many people who have the capacity to run” (Jampa 2014). Because of these 
negative effects, some Tibetans are advocating an alteration of the electoral system. 
Finally, the place the government is located, Dharamsala in Northern India, also 
symbolises Tibet, and not only because the government of Tibet moved there. Dharamshala 
means ‘temporary home’ in Hindi, reflecting the intention to return to Tibet. This name is said 
to be derived from ‘dharmashala’, which means ‘house of the gods’ (Anand 2007: 110). As 
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 The five religious traditions have 2 seats each, the three regions ten seats each. Besides that, two seats are 
reserved for exiles from North America and two others for exiles from Europe (Brox 2012: 459). 
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the Dalai Lama is now located there, both meanings have important symbolic value, referring 
to Dharamsala as the representation of the divine leadership of ‘Tibet’. The town is located in 
a mountainous area and was (especially before the government was located there) often 
described as difficult to reach. These qualities match the idea of Lhasa as ‘inaccessible’ and 
the ‘roof of the world’ (Anand 2007: 111-22). In Dharamsala and other Tibetan settlements in 
India, Tibetan cultural aspects and ‘free Tibet’ items are widespread. It is often claimed that 
these settlements are even more authentically Tibetan than Tibet itself. In these places a Tibet 
is ‘recreated’. This recreated ‘Tibet’ is the one that they remember and value. These images of 
‘Tibet’ are extensively emphasised in order to ‘preserve’ Tibetan culture (Hess 2009: 68). 
Tibetan settlements are ‘Tibet’, even more than the geographic area of Tibet itself. 
 
4. NARRATIVISING HISTORY 
The claim on ‘Tibet’ plays a primary role in Tibetan identity-making, and this claim is 
supported by a certain construction of history. Both Tibet and China have an interest in 
presenting history in a certain way. These narratives simplify history and impose modern 
concepts, mainly territoriality and sovereignty, on the past in order to support (or challenge) 
this claim. 
The Tibetan case is an example of a ‘narrativizing of reality’ (Campbell 1998: 34). 
Historical events are impossible to understand without being interpreted. Narratives give 
meaning to these events. There is always a choice in deciding which events are important and 
how they are related. The narratives of the past are thus not objective ‘facts’ but 
interpretations that can differ. Tibetans see history in light of the present and strategically 
(though sometimes unconsciously) construct their narrative. The specific interpretation that is 
used always serves a certain interest (Campbell 1998; Campbell 1999). Many narratives are 
constructed without official intervention, but in some cases the Tibetan government-in-exile 
discourages alternative readings in order to represent Tibetan history and identity in a positive 
light (Stoddard quoted in Huber 2001: 368). Tibetans need to argue that they have been a 
strong nation in the past, in order to strengthen their claim on Tibet. This territorial claim thus 
constructs the way the past is perceived, and this particular construction of history is part of 
the constitution of Tibetan identity. 
Before the 1950s, hierarchy and inequality were important aspects of Tibetan society.
4
 
Tibet was largely underdeveloped compared to Western countries around that time. These 
                                                          
4
 The concepts feudalism, serfdom and theocracy are often applied here. The precise terminology is contested 
and an examination of it falls outside the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of this issue see: Thargyal 1993. 
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aspects are not always mentioned by Tibetans, or are glossed over as minor negative aspects. 
Tibetans usually portray the Tibetans living in Tibet before exile as ‘happy’ people. When the 
Chinese entered ‘aggressively’ Tibetan culture was under attack. Chinese rule is thus equated 
with a destruction of culture and society. A recent report by the International Campaign for 
Tibet was titled 60 Years of Chinese Misrule: arguing cultural genocide in Tibet. In these 
narratives the facts that are used are not necessarily untrue, but the narrative that incorporates 
them (such as ‘genocide’) is political (Shakya 1999: xxii; ICT 2012).  
Before the 20
th
 century, local and ‘national’ authorities overlapped and borders were 
not clearly defined. Concepts such as territoriality and sovereignty did not exist in a modern 
sense. When Western powers, mainly England via India, came increasingly in contact with 
Tibet in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, these ideas began to take hold. In exile, these ideas 
were necessary in order to gain international support for their cause. The claim on Tibet that 
Tibetans make is thus grounded in an idea of territoriality that did not naturally exist. ‘Tibet’ 
as a place was discursively constructed, and this discursive idea of Tibet is still present in the 
claim on the territory (Anand 2007: 65-71). When the question of historical sovereignty is 
discussed, it is often not realised that the very asking of this question is already done from the 
present. This question imposes the concept of sovereignty on a past in which this concept was 
not known, and therefore this question is impossible to answer, even though Tibetans and 
Chinese are both answering it. 
Tibet did not have full sovereignty over all territories it currently claims, and historical 
Tibetan unity did not exist the way it is portrayed. Kham and Amdo were under the, mainly 
cultural and religious, influence of the central region U-Tsang, but full political authority did 
not exist (Anand 2007: 92-3). There is an ancient rivalry between U-tsang and the outer 
regions. These regional differences were aggravated by religious differences. The Dalai Lama 
belongs to the Gelugpa tradition. From 1537 until 1642 the Gelugpa and the Kagyupa sects 
were struggling for power in a direct confrontation. The former was dominant in U, while the 
later was dominant in Tsang (both located in U-tsang). At the end of this period the Gelugpa 
sect established its authority in Lhasa. In Kham other religious traditions such as Kagyupa 
still had much authority. Since then all monks in the Tibetan government in Lhasa were 
Gelugpas until the Chinese started promoting other traditions (Goldstein 1989: 1-2; Goldstein 
1997: 5-15; Norbu 2001: 65; Shakya 1999: 132). In the second half of the 1950s a revolt 
broke out in Kham. Most Khampas explicitly fought for their region, not Tibet as a whole. 
Lhasa did not identify much with them either and was initially reluctant to support the revolt 
(Shakya 1999: 173). The offering of a golden throne in 1957 by traders from Kham marked 
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the beginning of the creation of a national identity. This event symbolised the allegiance of 
Tibetans to the Dalai Lama as their leader and his authority over Tibet, though this unity did 
not fully exist in practice yet (Dreyfus 2002: 41; Shakya 1999: 165-6). Phala, a Lhasa official 
at the time, has argued that without the Tibetan uprising on March 10 a civil war between 
Lhasa and Kham could have broken out (Shakya 1999: 193). Resistance against the Chinese 
and the experience of exile unified Tibetans further, though these divisions still exist. 
Kagyupas have occasionally expressed discontent with the rule of the Dalai Lama (Brox 
2012: 460; Misra 2003: 190). However, in general Tibetans in exile nowadays refer to all 
Tibetan regions as one unity. The differences between regions are not a part of the official 
narrative, as this does not correspond to the unity of ‘Tibet’ as a whole and the claim of 
Tibetans on this ‘Tibet’. Tibetan nationalism is thus a recent construct, and the past is 
narrativised in way to match this construct. 
The narrative that is constructed does correspond to how most Tibetans have 
experienced and are still experiencing the situation. History can in that sense play an 
important psychological role in creating identities and policies. The collective trauma of flight 
and exile can make this trauma continuously relevant because the community is constantly 
giving meaning to these experiences, which influences current policies and identity discourse. 
Coping with these traumatic group experiences can cause a psychological need for reaction or 
resistance (Moses 2011), which makes reclaiming the homeland a goal of vital importance. 
The Tibetan experience of expulsion creates a need to reclaim this territory, which motivated 
by psychological rather than practical reasons, because ‘the terror of history is inscribed into 
the minds and bodies of its victims’ (Moses 2011: 101). The role of the claim on Tibet is thus 
psychological and discursive, rather than a practical need to live in the actual territory. The 
symbolic meaning of the territory thus plays an important role. 
 
5. EXCLUSION, OTHERING AND RELIGION 
The existence of an ‘Other’ is needed in order to be aware of one’s own identity. The 
Other is what the identity of the ‘Self’ is constructed against. National identity is thus 
‘invented’ discursively by practices of exclusion; it is not an ontological and fixed entity 
(Campbell 1998: 25-7). There can be different degrees of Othering (Hansen 2006: 37). Non-
Buddhists, Dorje Shugden practitioners, Bonpos or Chinese are not all necessarily Othered to 
the same extent. Religion often plays an important role in the Tibetan cases of exclusion. 
Tibetan culture and Buddhism are often equated (Lopez 1998: 200). The Tibetan 
constitution reads: “the future Tibetan polity .. shall endeavour to be a Free Social Welfare 
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State with its politics guided by the Dharma” (Tibetan Assembly 1991: art. 3, emphasis 
added). Politics and religion are not separated. Also in the daily life of Tibetans, religion plays 
an important identity-forming role. Religious festivals and centres form an opportunity for 
Tibetans to see each other and to feel connected to this community (anonymous interview 
2014; Roemer 2008: 147-8). Also in Western countries, Tibetans often wear traditional 
clothing to these occasions (Anonymous interview 2014). At these moments people are 
behaving as ‘Tibetans’ and thus express their own separate identity as a ‘Tibetan’. To some 
extent Tibetans are essentialising their own identity by constructing it in religious terms. 
Denying their own religiosity would undermine their identity as Tibetan. To stress religion is 
therefore also a claim on a certain identity and political position. It differentiates Tibetans 
from others (Chinese, Western) and thus emphasises the unique Tibetan culture, necessary for 
the Tibetan territorial claim.  
Dreyfus (2002: 53) asked: ‘how can one hold ideas, values and symbols that are sacred 
in any other way than absolutely?’ This is indeed the danger of the equation of Buddhism and 
Tibetan identity: it can lead to intolerance if only one way of understanding religion, and thus 
identity, is accepted. Religious minorities are in a difficult position if religion and national 
identity are equated. Bonpos for example have been marginalised in Tibetan identity 
discourse and the construction of ‘Tibet’. The myths of origin of Tibetans as a race are 
Buddhist, excluding others such as the Bonpos from the national identity (Lopez 1998: 197).  
Currently Bonpos enjoy the same number of seats in the Tibetan legislature, even though 
there numbers are smaller than those of other religious groups. Politically, they are therefore 
in fact ‘overrepresented’. However, other minorities such as Muslims, Christians and atheists, 
even though their numbers are small, are not represented (Brox 2012: 261). The emphasis on 
religion in defining Tibetan identity thus leads to exclusion. 
 
The Shugden controversy 
The emphasis on religion can also lead to internal exclusion, as different 
interpretations of religion are not always accepted. A clear example of drawing boundaries is 
the Shugden controversy. Recently the Dalai Lama has stated that people that follow him, 
should not worship Dorje Shugden. Shugden is traditionally a protective deity of the Gelugpa 
sect. According to the tradition, he originated as the spirit of a monk who died after false 
accusations. The spirit took revenge by causing natural disasters and other signs, after which 
the Gelugpas asked the spirit to stop its revenge and to become a protector. The Dalai Lama 
(and his predecessors) has prayed to Shugden in his earlier years, but since 1976 he has 
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stopped that practice and advised others to do the same. He based this policy on advice from 
the Nechung oracle. The Dalai Lama does not view Shugden as a protective deity or the 
reincarnation of a monk, but as an ‘evil spirit’. The Shugden practice would incite 
sectarianism as he is the deity of only one specific sect, and therefore inhibit the creation of a 
national identity and the independence struggle (Lopez 1998: 188-96). 
The controversy divided the community. It leads to concerns about the freedom of 
expression in the exile community. Because of the positive image and religious authority of 
the Dalai Lama, many stopped the practice. However, some disagreed and continued. As a 
consequence, a number of Shugden practitioners were attacked by other Tibetans. Several 
monks that practiced Shugden were found murdered, adding fire to the controversy. Some 
Tibetans accused Shugden practitioners of opposing the Tibetan cause or even of being 
‘terrorists’. The International Shugden Community (2013) is using this controversy to ‘show’ 
that the Dalai Lama is a ‘dictator’.5 Eventually some Shugden supporters applied for Indian 
citizenship in order to show that they did not belong to the (Dalai Lama dominated) Tibetan 
community anymore (Brox 2012: 456; Misra 2003: 193). This is an indicator of how much 
Tibetan ‘citizenship’ is based upon identification and imagining. 
This policy of exclusion fits within a long history in many different states to exclude 
certain people and frame them as threat. The Shugden practice belonged to one religious sect, 
and therefore did not fit within a common nationalist identity (Lopez 1998: 196; Misra 2003: 
192-3). Religious and traditional disagreements over whether the Shugden tradition fits into a 
traditional conception of Buddhism play an important role (Dreyfus 2005). This traditional 
disagreement with the practice as ‘not fitting’ leads to the assumption that it threatens a single 
coherent vision of Buddhism. However, the importance the Dalai Lama attaches to this 
problem of divisiveness, is in turn influenced by the present situation of exile and the claim on 
Tibet. Thus, tradition might influence how Shugden is seen, while the decision that this is a 
problem is influenced by modern circumstances and nationalism. The Dalai Lama wants to 
maintain unity, which requires a coherent national identity. In order to define Tibetan identity, 
it has to be defined against something else. As Shugden represents a vision not coherent with 
the vision of the Dalai Lama, it represents a threat to the construction of a single national 
identity. If an alternative identity can question the national identity as being the ‘true’ identity, 
it can be considered a threat (Campbell 1992: 3). This was clearly the case with the Shugden 
practice, leading to a quite extreme Othering of the practice. 
                                                          
5
 See page 9. 
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China as an Other 
Religious nationalism also leads to external exclusion, defining itself against non-
Buddhist and non-Tibetan Others. The West, with its Christian values or China with atheist 
values, are hereby created as an Other. Tibetans supposedly have the ‘peaceful’ and 
‘Buddhist’ values (often equated) that Westerners and Chinese do not have. The recent hype 
of Buddhism in the West corresponds to this. Buddhism is seen as a way out of the stressful 
life of Westerners, and in fact as a better lifestyle. Buddhism helps Tibetans to gain support 
from these Western Buddhists, and represents Tibetans as more peaceful people. Importantly, 
it represents them as different from and superior to the (‘more aggressive’) Chinese. In order 
to claim Tibet, Tibetans stress their ‘unique’ identity that is different from the Chinese. 
Othering of China is needed in order to support their claim, but also to define their own 
identity in the first place. This also leads to internal exclusion of Tibetans that have become 
‘too Chinese’. 
The impact of China on Tibetan identity construction was clear from the start. The 
Dalai Lama was accepted as the leader of all Tibetans because of the Chinese threat. The 
Tibetan regions all shared resentment against the Chinese, and because of the Chinese threat 
they eventually all unified behind the Dalai Lama.
6
 The Chinese threat thus played a defining 
role in the construction of Tibetan identity. Chinese suppression is equated with religious 
suppression. Because the Dalai Lama is a religious leader, his flight from Tibet is framed as 
both a political and a religious defeat. The Chinese were seen as a threat to Tibetan religion 
and thus identity. This Chinese threat to the ‘Buddhist Tibetans’ unified Tibetans, as religion 
was an aspect that the Tibetan regions and (most) religious traditions had in common (Kolas 
1996: 55; Shakya 1999: 209). 
The most important annual event that is not necessarily religious, is the Uprising Day 
at March 10. This day commemorates the Lhasa uprising against the Chinese that led to the 
flight of the Dalai Lama. This day is widely celebrated by Tibetans all over the world with 
traditional and recent symbols (Kolas 1996: 57). This day is important for the expression of 
national identity, while it symbolises resistance against the Chinese and the loss of the 
homeland from the Chinese. 
The justification of their claim on Tibet is based on the assumption that Tibetans have 
a separate identity from the Chinese and therefore need the freedom in Tibet to express that 
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 See pages 14-5 of this thesis and: Shakya 1999; Dreyfus 2002. 
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identity. This separate Tibetan identity, different from the Chinese, is therefore an important 
part of Tibetan identity construction. Many Tibetans refer to their culture as being very 
different from the Chinese (Hess 2009: 65). Yeh (2002) argues that many Tibetans claim to be 
able to distinguish between Tibetans and Chinese easily, while in reality they are often not 
able to do this. The physical differences between Chinese and Tibetans are exaggerated by 
both the Chinese and Tibetans, leading to false ideas of what Tibetans must look like. 
Tibetans are imagining themselves as a homogenous community that is separate from the 
Chinese, and therefore overemphasise differences with the Chinese (Yeh 2002).  
The differentiation between Tibetans and Chinese leads to a distantiating from 
Tibetans that have become too Chinese. Tibetans born in exile often have a very negative 
image of newcomers, who would have bad habits and have become too ‘Chinese’. Especially 
Tibetans that lived in Eastern Chinese cities often feel that they are not fully accepted 
anymore as a ‘real’ Tibetan. In exile, Tibetans that only speak Chinese or a regional Tibetan 
dialect and are thus unable to communicate in Tibetan, are often discriminated against (Yeh 
2002: 243; Vahali 2009: 26, 32). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Tibetan identity discourse is limited and stable, because of power structures. One of 
the most important power structures is the authority of the Dalai Lama. The claim on ‘Tibet’ 
plays an important role, as a particular discourse is advocated in order to claim back (an 
idealised vision of) ‘Tibet’. This image of ‘Tibet’ unifies Tibetans, and by claiming it 
Tibetans are expressing their own identity. Tibetan history is narrativised in a limited way in 
order to support the claim on ‘Tibet’ and boundaries are created both in order to create a 
coherent identity and by that to strengthen the claim on ‘Tibet’. Tibetan identity and (the 
claiming of) ‘Tibet’ are thus mutually constitutive.  
Discourses might limit the options available; they are also creating these options in the 
first place because discourses are inherently unstable and contradictory. Power structures can 
stabilise discourses, but if their importance would diminish, Tibetan agency might increase. 
Precisely because identities are constantly under construction, there are possibilities for 
change. Perhaps democratisation can lead to a more flexible national identity. A public debate 
can lead to more openness in forming alternative discourses. This process is already 
underway. As Tsering Jampa said about Tibetan elections: ‘last time in 2011 was also very 
different, people had to really come to the people and say: look, if I’m elected, I’m going to 
do this.. But we never had that before’ (Jampa 2014).  
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Though this situation might lead to more openness and freedom in identity 
construction, it might also increase divisions between Tibetans. Without a uniting identity it is 
possible that alternative discourses deviate too far from the national identity to be accepted by 
others. Two factors could play an important role in this. Firstly, after the future death of the 
Dalai Lama regional and religious differences might re-emerge. Without his unifying 
presence, divisions can become more visible. Secondly, when ‘Tibet’ becomes less of a 
factor, the community might fall apart. Many members of the younger generation have never 
been to Tibet. Newcomers come from a Tibet that is different from the Tibet the first 
generation came from. When the older generation is no longer there, Tibetans might feel less 
connected to their homeland. On the other hand, many young Tibetans are very active in the 
struggle to ‘free Tibet’ (e.g. TYC). These Tibetans often interpret the policy of ‘claiming back 
Tibet’ in a different way. They more easily accept violence and thereby differ from the 
mainstream discourse on Tibetan identity. It is thus possible to use an alternative discourse on 
‘Tibet’ and ‘Tibetans’ while still feeling connected to it.  
The national identity and discursively constructed ‘territory’ are mutually constitutive. 
This suggests that an actual geographical territory is not necessarily needed in order to unite a 
community. As long as there is ‘something’ to identify with, usually a place and a narrative of 
the history of that place, people can feel connected. By claiming this territory, people are 
claiming an identity to which they belong. This would for example imply that when 
Palestinians or Jews are claiming a territory, they are at the same time constructing their own 
identity. They have idealised images of their territory and want to construct this image in 
reality, because it is what they are. Whether these processes are indeed similar in the 
Palestinian and Israeli cases, merits further research. The relationship between religion and 
nationalism poses similar interesting questions. This thesis showed that an ‘imagined 
community’ can be based on religion, but that this religion can lead to exclusion. Are the 
same processes at work in Islamic, Christian, Jewish or Hindu communities? 
This thesis has shown that Tibetans provide IR with an interesting case. Because of the 
separation of territory and people, the relationship between territory and identity can be well 
researched. The Tibetan diaspora can however shed light on more aspects relevant to the 
study of IR. In order to understand Sino-Indian or Sino-American relations, to analyse the 
absence of sovereignty or to research human rights, the Tibetan case could provide valuable 
insights. Hopefully this thesis can inspire IR scholars to look beyond conventional research 
topics.  
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